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While the very first non-communist government in Polish post-war his-
tory “demonstrated the truism that only revolutionaries are able to impose 
austerity,”1 its executives declared that austerity measures would bring 
fruits only when all links with the past were broken. The Prime Minister 
announced in his inaugural speech the need to draw a “bold line” between 
the inglorious past and the brighter future, and the technocratic finance 
minister justified the drastic dismantling of socialist industry by his belief 
that a market economy could be built only on completely new founda-
tions. This revolutionary ambition to make a radical break with the past 
was never realized: sociologists and other observers soon noticed that the 
new order was not being built on the ruins of state Socialism, but with 
those ruins.2 
Between 1987 and 1994 dozens of feature films critical of the socialist 
regime were made. Most of them were still financed by the socialist econ-
omy until the “austerity measures” introduced in January 1990 cast the 
film industry into dire financial straits. The latest among them—
Kazimierz Kutz’s Death as a Slice of Bread (Śmierć jak kromka chleba, 
1994), describing the violent confrontation between Silesian strikers and 
police at the Wujek coal mine after the imposition of Martial Law in De-
cember 1981—was already co-financed by private investors including the 
workers who were determined to put their tragedy on celluloid (Fig. 1).3 
The political climate changed after the elections that brought a post-
communist party to power in 1993. The post-Communists embraced the 
                                  
 1 Stanley Aronowitz, The Politics of Identity: Class, Culture, Social Movements (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), 48. 
 2 Lászlo Bruszt, David Stark, Post-Socialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Prop-
erty in East Central Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
 3 Kazimierz Kutz, “Mordęga” [The Grind], Kino 5 (1994): 4–8.  
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Fig. 1 Kazimerz Kutz’s Death as a Slice of Bread came out when the ethos of Solidarity 
was at its lowest point (courtesy Studio Filmowe TOR) 
 
“bold line” approach, and preferred to “choose the future.”4 What their 
critics described as “the politics of amnesia”5 soon turned into the politics 
of nostalgia. Public television started broadcasting old socialist series and 
comedies, and the emerging private channels followed suit. In many cases 
such “recycled” films were more popular than those in the very same 
genre produced after 1989.6 While some films acquired cult status, attract-
ing millions of viewers who knew parts of them by heart and referred to 
them in daily conversation, only two “nostalgic” films were made.7 The 
period of “nostalgia” (roughly from 1994 to 2003), when the socialist hits 
                                  
 4 Aleksander Kwaśniewski’s campaign slogan in 1995. 
 5 Michał Głowiński, “PRL-owskie mity i realia” [Myths and the truth about the people’s 
Poland] in Michał Głowiński (ed.), Dzień Ulissesa i inne szkice na tematy niemitologic-
zne [Ulysses’s day and other essays] (Cracow: PiW, 2000). 
 6 Karolina Wajda, “07 wciąż się zgłąsza” [07 still on duty], Kultura Popularna 10 (2004): 
41–9. 
 7 Monika Talarczyk-Gubała, “Kultura popularna i nostalgia za komunizmem” [Popular 
culture and nostalgia for Communism], Kultura Popularna 10 (2004): 33. 
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regained their popularity, partially overlapped with the rule of the post-
communist Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who won the elections of 1995 by a 
small margin, but whose support never fell below 80% in the last four 
years of his presidency.8 
The post-Communists began to lose the upper hand in symbolic poli-
tics in late 2002, when a major corruption scandal broke out and a Parlia-
mentary commission was formed to investigate it. Its sessions were 
broadcast live and followed by millions, as if they were a top-rate televi-
sion series.9 Moreover, the Institute of National Remembrance – Commis-
sion for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation, established 
in 1998 and holding exclusive rights over the archives of the communist 
secret services, initiated a wide debate on the role of the secret police be-
fore and after 1989 by a variety of publications, documentary films, and 
especially by documents brought to the attention of the public through the 
media. These were the main instruments employed by the political right in 
making a case that Communism was a crime and post-Communists were 
criminals.10 When in 2005 a right-wing government was formed it already 
had a clear vision of the “historical politics” it wanted to pursue. The 
newly appointed president of public television declared that Four Troop-
ers and a Dog (Czterej pancerni i pies, 1966–1970), a highly popular 
socialist series about the liberation of Poland from the Nazi occupation by 
the Red Army with the help of Polish soldiers, would never again be 
broadcast by public television, which would sponsor an alternative series 
showing the “historical truth” instead.11 
Since the novelty in politics after 1989 was the immense influence of 
the mass media, it is no wonder that the way Socialism was portrayed can 
be easily correlated with the distribution of political power. This is espe-
cially the case because public television, traditionally loyal to the gov-
ernment, was the most important institution financing the production of 
films and documentaries in post-socialist Poland.12 The farewell to tradi-
tional politics and the growing power of the electronic media, or in Alek-
                                  
 8 Kacper Pobłocki, “Europe, the Pope and the Holy Left Alliance in Poland,” Focaal. 
European Journal of Anthropology 43 (2004): 130.  
 9 Kazimierz Kutz, “Śląsk jest, Rywina nie ma” [Silesia exists and Rywin does not], Przek-
rój 28 (2003): 28–31. 
10 Karol Modzelewski, “IPN: kto historyk, kto trąba?” [Who works at the institute for 
National Remembrance?], Gazeta Wyborcza (13–15 August 2005): 12. 
11 Renata Radłowska, “Szarikowi uciąć ogon” [Cutting Szarik’s tail off], Gazeta Wyborcza 
(24 July 2006): 6. 
12 Marek Haltof, Kino polskie [Polish cinema] (Gdańsk: Słowo, obraz/terytoria, 2004), 218.  
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sander Kwaśniewski’s words, the replacement of (political) vision by 
television, was a bitter consequence of the way modern liberal democracy 
worked. When the populace turned into an electorate in 1989, the political 
elite had to communicate with it, and popular tastes, often despised by the 
highbrow establishment, suddenly had to be taken into account. Those 
who appreciated this change, like Kwaśniewski who during his 1995 
campaign danced to the allegedly “crass” disco polo music, triumphed. 
Just as the uncompromising anti-Communism of the late 1980s and the 
films that severely criticized the regime were clearly a political project 
closely associated with the Solidarity movement, the moment of “nostalgia” 
came as a grassroots reaction to it. Nostalgia was a late “rebellion of the 
masses,” formerly repressed by the socialist system that tried to steer televi-
sion from above, as Teresa Bogucka argued.13 Already in 1997 she regretted 
that young people found socialist comedies amusing, arguing that Socialism 
was “more sinister and destructive than what emerges from the hodgepodge 
served today on television. Entertaining people with images of how ridicu-
lous People’s Poland was is a further humiliation for those who had been 
repressed by it.”14 Despite some efforts to understand the roots of nostalgia, 
most intellectuals simply deplored it.15 The highbrow media sounded the 
alarm, for example, at the results of a survey which demonstrated that over 
half the Polish population thought that Edward Gierek, the 1970s socialist 
leader, had accomplished more for Poland than Lech Wałęsa, the legendary 
head of Solidarity; soon after Gierek’s death in 2001, statues of him were 
erected and streets named after him.16 The recent “historical politics” of the 
right-wing government is clearly a reaction to the alleged collective amne-
sia, or a penchant for “history without guilt.”17 Yet despite the efforts of the 
right-wing elite to teach the masses about “true” Polish post-war history and 
to remind them of the communist crimes, for example by commemorating 
the 25th anniversary of the imposition of Martial Law in Poland, over half 
                                  
13 Teresa Bogucka, Triumfujące profanum. Telewizja po przełomie 1989 [Triumphing 
profanum. Television after 1989] (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sic!, 2002). 
14 Bogucka quoted in Talarczyk-Gubała, “Kultura popularna i nostalgia za komunizmem,” 
36. 
15 Filip Modrzejewski, Monika Sznajderman, Nostalgia. Eseje o tęsknocie za komunizmem 
[Nostalgia: Essays on longing for Communism] (Wołowiec: Wydawnictwo Czarne, 
2002). 
16 “Komuno wróć” [Who wants Communism back?], Gazeta Wyborcza (26 May 2004): 1; 
Waldemar Kuczyński, “Dlaczego tęsknimy do Gierka i PRL” [Why do we long for 
Gierek and People’s Poland?], Gazeta Wyborcza, (4 June 2004): 16. 
17 Talarczyk-Gubała, “Kultura popularna i nostalgia za komunizmem,” 36. 
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the adult Polish population still regarded the decision to declare Martial 
Law as correct.18 
This contrast partially boils down to a difference between political and 
private history. Jacek Kuroń argued in 1995 that the “history of People’s 
Poland is not only the history of anti-communist struggle, but it is also the 
history of the people who built post-war Poland with their day-to-day 
toil.”19 Oskar Kaszyński confessed that the idea for his nostalgic Segment 
’76 (2003) had emerged from conversations with his father, who would 
not complain about the secret police or the curfew, but rather told stories 
about daily coping with economic shortages.20 It was not a coincidence 
that private history focused mainly on the early 1970s—the heyday of 
State Socialism—and, in a sense, filled in the pages of history written, 
with little enthusiasm, by professional historians.21 Political historians and 
filmmakers associated with Solidarity clearly preferred the Stalinist era, 
which fitted the anti-communist template best. The contemporary Polish 
historiography of Socialism can also be divided according to the politi-
cal/private dichotomy. Many of the established historians affiliated with 
the well-subsidized Institute for National Remembrance focus on political 
history-writing even in the genre of crime fiction,22 whereas a younger 
generation, born predominantly in the late 1970s and early 1980s, gath-
ered mainly around Professor Marcin Kula and since 2000 has published 
over thirty volumes (mostly Masters’ and some doctoral theses) on the 
cultural, social or even material history of People’s Poland.23 
 
 
MAKING SOCIALISM VISIBLE 
 
Visual material is indispensable in the debates on the recent past. The 
very first attempt to write a comprehensive history of People’s Poland—
Jacek Kuroń’s and Jacek Żakowski’s People’s Poland for Beginners—
                                  
18 Małgorzata Solecka, “Pamiętamy tak jak chcemy” [We remember what we like], 
Rzeczpospolita (13 December 2006): 1. 
19 Jacek Kuroń, Jacek Żakowski, PRL dla początkujących [People’s Poland for beginners] 
(Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, 1995): 280–2. 
20 See his interview in a documentary by Piotr Boruszkowski and Sławomir Koehler, The 
Fashionable 1980s (Moda na Obciach, 2003). 
21 Krzysztof Burnetko, “O jaką przeszłość walczymy?” [What sort of past are we fighting 
for?], Polityka 47 (2006): 10. 
22 Andrzej Paczkowski, “Śmierć rewizjonisty” [Death of a revisionist], Polityka 41 (2006): 80. 
23 Burnetko, “O jaką przeszłość walczymy?” 14.  
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put visuals and text on an equal footing. Its over 300 pages featured 
more than 500 color illustrations, ranging from photographs of the peo-
ple, places, or events described, through reproductions of posters, car-
toons, archival documents, money, newspaper articles, manuscripts, 
stamps, and book covers to photographs of commodities and material 
objects. It was supposed “not to be a memoir, nor a school book, but a 
kind of illustrated guidebook” that would constitute “the very first step 
towards building a museum about People’s Poland” where Żakowski, 
who “remembered only half of People’s Poland’s history personally,” 
could bring his children.24 As a “critical witness” to the entire socialist 
period, Jacek Kuroń presented himself as an ideal guide through such a 
virtual museum. The book and the visuals it contained thus intended to 
provide a bridge between three generations who had spent their respec-
tive childhoods in the interwar period (like Kuroń, born in 1934), during 
or just after Stalinism (like Żakowski, born in 1957) and during the final 
years of Socialism (like Żakowski’s children, born in the 1980s). 
Images served as epistemic bridges and constituted “testimonies” of 
Socialism as important as those provided by its eyewitnesses. As early 
as the 1980s the generation of filmmakers making political cinema, too 
young to remember Stalinism personally, created a vision of it anchored 
in socialist realist iconography. Socialist realism was extremely “photo-
genic” with its banners, red flags and stars, huge portraits, mass parades, 
rallies of enthusiastic youth, monumental construction sites, and black 
limos carrying secret police in black coats, as was confessed by Robert 
Gliński, the author of Sunday Pranks (Niedzielne igraszki, 1983, first 
screened in 1988) where the day of Stalin’s death is seen through chil-
dren’s eyes. Gliński was one of the many directors from the “Martial 
Law Generation” who chose to set their films on Socialism in the years 
of their own childhood. They did so partly because Stalinism had been 
“closed” and they were officially allowed to criticize it, and partly be-
cause Stalinism could serve as a powerful metaphor for Poland in the 
early 1980s.25 The youngest generation of filmmakers who grew up un-
der Martial Law, however, did not set their films in the gloomy early 
1980s. Both Sztos (Sztos, 1997) by Olaf Lubaszenko (born in 1968) and 
Segment ’76 by Oskar Kaszyński (born in 1978) were set in the mid-
1970s. Although this period was the heyday of Socialism, neither film 
                                  
24 Kuroń, Żakowski, PRL dla początkujących, 2. 
25 Haltof, Kino polskie, 268, 259.  
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glorified it. Rather, they sought to reject the language of political revi-
sionism, and embraced a wholly different critical aesthetic. 
It would be misleading to call these films nostalgic, as critics did.26 It 
was not nostalgia, but fetishism—a concept germane to nostalgia but be-
longing to economic theory—that constituted them. Just as in Kuroń and 
Żakowski’s quasi-museum, “Socialism” in both films was communed 
with by “objects.” Both films were “economic comedies” and starred 
things as well as people. Sztos shows how two swindlers make easy 
money: they cheat Western tourists while changing their hard currency 
into Polish złotys. Desire for a fashionable furniture item known as seg-
ment is the reason why a young graduate embarks on “economic tourism” 
in Segment ’76. Neither Lubaszenko nor Kaszyński intended to meticu-
lously reconstruct the economic realities of People’s Poland, but rather 
mocked them.27 The low-key Segment ’76 seemed not to feature actors, 
but merely today’s twenty-somethings who “dressed up” as their parents 
when they were in their twenties. The acting in Sztos was criticized for not 
being convincing enough. This lack of realism only strengthened the im-
pression that both films were fakes. Both films were first and foremost 
pastiches of Western movies—Sztos was a tribute to George Roy Hill’s 
The Sting (1973) and Segment ’76 drew heavily from Guy Ritchie’s 
Snatch (2000). It could be argued that Sztos does not even use “real” loca-
tions, but takes the audience on a guided tour through old socialist come-
dies. It bristles with intertextuality and allusions to places from other mov-
ies and even uses their original soundtracks, as it does in the crucial scene 
in which the two protagonists, trying to fall asleep in a hotel room, hear a 
famous conversation from Andrzej Kondratiuk’s Uplifted (Wniebowzięci, 
1973).28 Even though the two characters from Uplifted indeed had that 
conversation in a hotel corridor, this “quote” in Sztos was doubly false: 
first, it consisted of sentences from two different dialogues, and second, 
such a virtual meeting could never have taken place, because the heroes of 
both films visited hotels in different cities.29 Just as the Western tourists 
were left with fake cash in Sztos, the viewers face a “counterfeit Social-
ism” in these two films. 
                                  
26 Andrzej Kołodyński, “Nostalgia bliższego stopnia” [A closer look at nostalgia], Kino 7 
(1997): 42; Talarczyk-Gubała, “Kultura popularna,” 33–8. 
27 Talarczyk-Gubała, “Kultura popularna,” 37. 
28 Kołodyński, “Nostalgia bliższego stopnia,” 42.  
29 Maciej Łuczak, Wniebowzięci czyli jak to się robi hydrozagadkę [Uplifted or how to 
make a hydro-puzzle] (Warsaw: Prószyński i Spółka, 2004), 15–6.  
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People’s Poland for Beginners, Sztos, and Segment ’76 were all at-
tempts to build “quasi-museums” of People’s Poland, where fetishes of 
Socialism were gazed at. Why was Socialism suddenly put on public dis-
play? The invasion of audiovisual culture that surprised and often irritated 
commentators in the early 1990s, to which Kuroń and Żakowski’s book 
was a clear response, and the post-modern intertextuality of Sztos and 
playfulness of Segment ’76, deplored by the critics of “nostalgia” were 
actually the harbingers of an emerging economic order where signs, 
commodity fetishism, the commercialization of culture, and advertising 
played key roles30 and which manifested itself in the “replacement of poli-
tics by economics.”31 Similar changes were affecting the cinema, where 
commercial films of mainly North American provenance quickly replaced 
the local productions. Film directors, who were used to high social es-
teem, after the change of the regime were deprived of their romantic mis-
sion to illuminate and guide the nation. If in 1991, 18% of all films dis-
tributed in Polish cinemas were Polish, in 1995 this number fell to 10%. 
The Polish films’ share of all the profits derived from ticket sales was 
even more modest: 9.4% in 1991 and 5.2% in 1995.32 
Succor to the “national pride,” damaged by the domination of Hol-
lywood, came from old socialist comedies, watched by millions—when 
the public television broadcast Stanisław Bareja’s Teddy Bear (Miś, 
1980) on 26 January 1998, it was watched by over 22% of all television 
viewers.33 While films by erstwhile giants of national cinema such as 
Andrzej Wajda and Krzysztof Zanussi were largely ignored—Zanussi’s 
At Full Gallop (Cwał, 1996), showing how a former aristocrat lived 
through Stalinism, was watched in cinemas by a mere 5000 people34—
Bareja’s comedies were cherished in retrospect as the “best documenta-
ries and archival sources on the socialist era”35 and works that “tell 
more about People’s Poland than lofty volumes.”36 The notion of 
                                  
30 Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (St. Louis, MO: 
Telis Press, 1981); David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the 
Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 284–307. 
31 Haltof, Kino polskie, 219. 
32 Haltof, Kino polskie, 217–9. 
33 Maciej Łuczak, Miś czyli rzecz o Stanisławie Barei [Teddy bear or the story of Stanisław 
Bareja] (Warsaw: Prószyński i Spółka, 2001), 91. 
34 Haltof, Kino polskie, 263. 
35 Bożena Janicka, “Misior” [The Teddy bear], Kino 3 (1997): 19.  
36 Rafał Ziemkiewicz, “Miś nieśmiertelny” [The immortal Teddy bear], Cinema Polska 12 
(2003): 23. 
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Bareizm, coined in the early 1970s by Bareja’s colleague at the Łódź 
Film School to denote kitsch and formal mediocrity, now stood for a 
perfect depiction of the absurdities of the socialist system. Interviewed 
for a documentary entitled Bareizm (1997), figures like Wajda and 
Zanussi admitted that Bareja had been unfairly criticized and marginal-
ized before 1989, and in fact the formal mediocrity of his films (partly 
because he did not have the resources to re-shoot scenes, and partly 
because he did not care) perfectly captures the chaos of the socialist 
economy.37 In 1998, a glossy magazine declared that Bareja’s films 
were fetishes of the 1980s, consigned them to the same “fetish” basket 
as socialist commodities and advertising slogans, and hailed his televi-
sion series Taxi Drivers (Zmiennicy, 1986) as a “ballad about Turkish 
jeans.”38 “Original” socialist comedies constituted better showpieces for 
the quasi-museum about People’s Poland than any films made in the 
1990s. That was how the television set became a private virtual “mu-
seum” of sorts, where Socialism was directly accessible via its many 
fetishes. Socialist comedies were broadcast on television in the 1990s 
as a cheap and very reliable method of attracting wide audiences and 
raising TV rates for commercials. When in January 2007 a ski-jumping 
contest was suddenly cancelled, public television broadcast Bareja’s 
Teddy Bear instead, and still three million sport fans found watching it 
worthwhile, although Teddy Bear had been shown on public television 
alone nineteen times since 2000.39 
After over a decade of such visual “recycling,” film critics have gath-
ered enough material to identify the new role of commodities in writing 
history. Rafał Marszałek’s The Cinema of Found Objects is a compelling 
attempt to trace how Poland’s twentieth century history, especially its 
socialist period, was recorded in its cinematography.40 Marszałek envi-
sioned a “Bureau of Lost Objects” where he placed various imponder-
ables culled from Polish films. By describing how selected props 
“acted” in Polish films over the last century, Marszałek excavated the 
history of Polish everyday life and traced how dress code, interior de-
sign, and sexual habits were transformed. Material objects, commodities, 
                                  
37 Łuczak, Miś, 27, 87–8, 139.  
38 Ibid., 126. 
39 Krystyna Lubelska, “Kochany Pan Tym” [The beloved Mr. Tym], Polityka 5 (2007): 62. 
40 Rafał Marszałek, Kino rzeczy znalezionych [The cinema of found objects] (Gdańsk: 
Słowo, obraz/terytoria, 2006); see also Dorota Skotarczak, Obraz społeczeństwa PRL w 
komedii filmowej [The image of People’s Poland and its society in film comedy] 
(Poznań: Adam Mickiewicz University Press, 2004).  
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and even money were at once the starting points and the protagonists in 
his story. However, in order to understand the intertextuality of Sztos, 
the playfulness of Segment ’76 and the mesmerizing “fetish” qualities of 
socialist comedies, we need to go a step further and turn to the economic 
theory that reveals the circumstances under which socialist commodities 
were made visible after 1989. 
Before the fall of Socialism, as Frances Pine has argued, labor was the 
main measure of value, and work done for the state, unlike work done 
“privately,” was considered exploitative and hence downgraded.41 As a 
consequence, commodities produced in the state sector were devalued, 
and social status was measured by one’s access to, and possession of, rare 
Western goods, acquired outside the state economy. This socialist “cargo 
cult,”42 an incarnation of commodity fetishism that usually occurs when 
the production and consumption of commodities are geographically sepa-
rated, was possible because the actual process of production of the West-
ern goods was invisible to the socialist consumers.43 When the post-1989 
order clearly started privileging Western goods, undercutting Polish pro-
ducers, it was viewed by many as a betrayal of the promises pinned upon 
the demise of State Socialism. Consumers tried to unite the domains of 
consumption and production that had been so painfully divorced by the 
new economic order and began valuing goods produced by well-known 
and visible processes, which led them to favor “intrinsically” Polish goods 
over imported ones. Socialism was re-envisioned as a system where Poles 
produced accessible goods for the domestic market, and the two domains 
of production and consumption were reunited in the mythical body of the 
family, the nation, and the socialist past. These were, Pine suggested, the 
roots of both that recurrent banal nationalism and the nostalgia for Social-




                                  
41 Frances Pine, “From Production to Consumption in post-Socialism?” in Michał 
Buchowski (ed.), Poland beyond Communism: “Transition” in Critical Perspective 
(Fribourg: University Press Fribourg, 2002), 209–24. 
42 Pine, “From Production to Consumption in post-Socialism?” 210. 
43 Arjun Appadurai, “Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value” in Arjun Ap-
padurai (ed.), The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 48; Pine, “From production to consump-
tion,” 210. 
44 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage Publications, 1995). 
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CONTRASTING SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM 
 
Before Socialism was watched “ritually” on TV screens,45 it became a key 
element in restructuring labor, for example in the Polish socialist firm 
Alima, which was sold in 1992 to the multinational Gerber. Even though 
labor had been commoditized in Socialism,46 the most novel thing about 
the post-1989 order was a free market that restructured the exchange of 
commoditized labor for money between employees and employers. Facing 
the constant threat of “redundancy,” Alima-Gerber’s Polish employees, as 
Elizabeth Dunn described, made tremendous efforts to transform their 
erstwhile socialist “selves” into “capitalist persons.”47 They did so to 
prove, both to their American employers and to the colleagues with whom 
they competed on the emerging labor market, that their labor had a higher 
value, because it was “capitalist.” That is how both Socialism and Capital-
ism became “things” one could sell as part of one’s commoditized labor, 
or “identity.” Therefore, local managers “managed” their new personali-
ties by consuming Western prestige goods, and slick salesmen imagined 
themselves as living advertisements, believing that their private penchant 
for “movement” in life ensured a swifter market circulation of the com-
modities they sold. White-collar workers established their “capitalist” 
identity in opposition to the manual workers, who were labeled “socialist” 
and not allowed to participate in consuming the fruits of Alima-Gerber’s 
market success on the grounds that they were relicts of the “socialist past” 
rather than important elements of the capitalist machine.48 
The enormous success of Alima-Gerber’s soft drink Frugo was a tell-
ing example of the use of such dichotomies in advertising. Frugo televi-
sion spots featured a hip teenager dressed in baggy clothes, spray-painting 
a “gray” world populated by “socialist” talking heads openly outraged by 
his joyfulness and dynamism. The four flavors of the soft drink featured 
four versions of “socialist” adults admonishing the teenager’s unfettered 
consumption. In the “red” Frugo advertisement, for example, a fat old 
lady in a black suit shouts at the camera: “today’s unruly youth should 
realize that we often lacked beets and could not even dream about fruits!” 
                                  
45 Monika Talarczyk-Gubała, “Kino kultu po polsku” [Polish cult cinema], Kultura 
Popularna 13 (2005): 23–8. 
46 Martha Lampland, The Object of Labor: Commodification in Socialist Hungary (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 5. 
47 Elizabeth Dunn, Privatizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and the Remaking of the 
Polish Labor (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 59. 
48 Dunn, Privatizing Poland, chapter 3. 
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This advertisement from 1996 sought to reconstruct the “ambience” of 
Socialism by presenting some of its fetishes—furniture, interior decora-
tion, clothes, the staple foods of the shortage economy, and especially the 
image of an infuriated communist talking head. However, there was not a 
speck of nostalgia in it. Frugo glorified the new market economy and its 
central protagonist—the possessive individual—and soon became for 
many journalists the epitome of aggressive and unforgiving “young” 
Capitalism.49 
The authors of the Frugo campaign did not invent the stark contrast 
between Capitalism and Socialism, but exploited a construct that had 
emerged in the 1980s.50 Even though it has been argued that Socialism 
was conceived as the “anti-world” to Capitalism,51 it was the crisis years 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s, at least in Polish cinematography, that 
first gave birth to a dichotomy that reified Socialism and Capitalism as 
two distinct worlds. Films critical of Socialism had been made and 
screened ever since the “Thaw” period of the late 1950s, and after 1976 
the criticism accelerated and was codified by critics and filmmakers as 
“cinema of moral anxiety.” It is regarded as having made its appearance in 
1976, the year of the first outbreak of the series of economic crises within 
the planned economy and the emergence of the radical opposition group, 
KOR. It was curbed in 1981, when Martial Law was imposed, the Solidar-
ity trade union banned, its major figures detained and the screw of censor-
ship tightened. It criticized the growing rift between official propaganda 
and everyday life under “really existing Socialism,” presenting the 
(im)moral choices that people—especially young intellectuals in provin-
cial towns—faced in their everyday lives. However, as Maria Korna-
towska argued, the “cinema of moral anxiety” provided only constructive 
criticism from within, not due to limits imposed by censorship, but rather 
because of its “intellectual naivety and formal poverty.”52 It never actually 
portrayed Socialism as fundamentally evil, but only showed how minor 
cogs in the socialist machine—such as its provincial executives—“got it 
wrong.” This limitation could also be a consequence of the time-lag in-
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trinsic to film production in socialist Poland—for example, Andrzej Wa-
jda’s Man of Marble (Człowiek z marmuru, 1976), which told the bitter 
story of a 1950s Stakhanovite who lost his initial enthusiasm for Social-
ism, was written in 1962, but it took fifteen years of struggle with Party 
officials to make the film.53 The “cinema of moral anxiety” addressed the 
issues that were significant before 1976 and failed to respond to the un-
folding economic crisis. Only the commercial cinema of the early 1980s 
did so, and that is why the highbrow cinema of the 1970s and early 1980s 
collected dust on archival shelves, whereas socialist comedies, formerly 
looked down on, triumphed in the 1990s.54 
These comedies rested on the dichotomy between “abnormal” and 
“normal” worlds. The concept of “normality,” as Jacek Kurczewski argued, 
emerged in the 1980s and served as a template for the envisioned post-
socialist order.55 It was central to both the popular rejection of “really exist-
ing Socialism” in the 1980s and the initial support for economic restructur-
ing in the early 1990s. The desire to live in a “normal world” disguised the 
criticism of socialist economic reality. In part, it was a return to the socialist 
governments’ policy of “normalization,” a rhetoric that in the 1980s urged 
the population to reject the Solidarity “anarchists” and “madmen,” and to 
revert to the stability and order of early 1970s Consumer Socialism.56 It 
grew out of the everyday experience of Martial Law, which had suspended 
the previous order and created a new reality literally overnight,57 urging 
people to reject “Polish surrealism,” as one of the Solidarity leaders did in 
the late 1980s in Maria Zmarz-Koczanowicz’s History of a camera (His-
toria pewnej kamery, 1993). The “everyday surrealism” of Martial Law 
grew out the economic crisis that struck Poland between 1976 and 1981, 
when—with the foreign currencies being the only “real” money in the coun-
try—everyday routines were turned upside down.58 
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Already under Martial Law some people experienced conditions as 
“surreal” and amusing. For example, the Krakow Automobile Club organ-
ized “rallies of economical driving,” where prizes were given to those 
who used the least petrol. In 1982 one such rally was won by a Polski Fiat 
owner, who used only 3.31 liters of petrol per 100 kilometers (much less 
than on official test drives).59 Such festivities ridiculed the 1970s “catch-
ing up” project (with Polski Fiat as its supposed miracle product). In the 
1980s the “normal world” of unlimited consumer goods was usually lo-
cated beyond the Iron Curtain. The two worlds appeared ontologically 
different: an “ersatz state” Socialism was plagued by notorious shortages, 
while Capitalism seemed from afar a land of plenty safeguarded by a 
“natural” (a metonym for “normal”) order.60 
Such a dichotomy between the “natural” and “artificial” worlds was 
first captured in Juliusz Machulski’s Sexmission (Seksmisja, 1983). It was 
a cathartic anti-utopia, watched by over thirteen million Poles just after 
Martial Law was lifted.61 Its two main characters decide to become guinea 
pigs, placed in hibernation to be brought back to life three years later. How-
ever, when they wake up they discover that many more years have passed 
and a nuclear holocaust has wiped out all life on the Earth’s surface, includ-
ing all male human beings. The underground society consists only of 
women, who have mastered the methods of artificial reproduction. Eventu-
ally the two heroes escape and realize that the underground world is a fake. 
The head of the women’s council turns out to be a man who has always 
been afraid of women. They join him in his comfortable cottage in a breath-
taking natural surrounding, together with two Amazons, who quickly turn 
into pliant kittens, as the men teach them the basics of conventional repro-
duction. 
Although Machulski’s film was one of the cult comedies of the 1990s, 
it was Bareja’s Teddy Bear that, for most people, captured the essence of 
the socialist world in a nutshell.62 The ironic science-fiction language 
deployed by Machulski was transparent enough already in the 1980s: the 
scene in which the two heroes walk across a post-nuclear wasteland, dis-
covering that it is a fake, was an intelligent pastiche of socialist science 
fiction, except that here the astronauts faced “neither good or bad Com-
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munism” but a natural order, based upon patriarchal relations.63 As Agni-
eszka Graf argues, Sexmission rested on the popular 1980s myth that So-
cialism, commonly referred to by the feminine word komuna, symboli-
cally castrated Polish men, who ceased to be the real breadwinners and 
economic heads of families as women became the “hunters” who stood in 
endless queues for long hours. The men could regain their masculinity 
only by engaging in anti-communist politics.64 
Unlike Bareja’s Teddy Bear, Sexmission could never provide a relevant 
representation of the “absurdities” of Socialism65 because its vision of a 
natural order was political and not economic. Teddy Bear opens with a 
scene in which socialist traffic policemen set up dummy cardboard houses 
next to a highway, so that they can fine drivers for speeding in a “built-up 
area.” While the police officers explain to the drivers why they have to pay, 
one of the three dummy houses falls apart when somebody accidentally 
pulls out one of the pegs that held it upright. Since two houses do not count 
as a built-up area, the fines are null and void. Socialism, Bareja suggests, is 
a system designed for exploitation, but does not actually work very well. 
The person who accidentally ruins the police’s wicked plan is Ryszard 
Ochódzki—the manager of a second-rate sports club on his way to a tour-
nament abroad—who just stopped for a pee. At the border it turns out that 
somebody has torn several pages from his passport. He realizes that it was 
his former wife, who hoped to stop him going to London, where they have 
a large sum of money in a joint bank account. Since she has married a 
high party official, Ochódzki cannot get a new passport. He therefore con-
trives a complicated intrigue in the hope of withdrawing the money before 
she can. He tells a film director whom he has befriended that an English 
aunt has been sending him money ever since he was a child. His parents, 
in order to get more, once told her that he had a twin. After many years, 
the aunt now wants to come for a visit, and Ochódzki needs a look-alike 
to pose as his non-existent brother. He promises his friend the money the 
generous aunt is bringing for his twin. He is given a small role in a film 
and pretends to fall ill, providing the excuse to search for a double. When 
they find one, Ochódzki gets a naïve actress to seduce him and steal the 
passport that Ochódzki has meanwhile arranged for his look-alike. She 
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believes that Ochódzki needs the passport so that they can leave for Lon-
don together and act in a Polański movie, but he goes alone, and arrives 
just in time. 
Ochódzki is cunning, guided by crude self-interest, and the only person 
who actually knows what the entire intrigue is about.66 The resources 
needed to pull it off are enormous—Ochódzki and the film director spend 
large sums of public money only to draw a small private profit from it. 
But, as Ochódzki says in a crucial scene, when he persuades his friend to 
participate in the scam, “we should not be Pewexes and mix up two sys-
tems of thought,” that is, mix up the state socialist economy with the real 
economy based upon foreign currency.67 Pewex was the trademark of 
“internal export,” a franchise where Poles could buy both Western goods 
and Polish “export” commodities for hard currency; it was designed to 
drain the population of the precious Western cash that the government 
urgently needed to pay back foreign loans. The universe of Bareja’s Teddy 
Bear is saturated with the schizophrenic division between the fake social-
ist economy that all its characters have the misfortune to live in and the 
capitalist world that they apparently all long for. 
Ochódzki is a classic anti-hero of the cinema of moral anxiety, very 
much like the main character in Bareja’s earlier What Will You Do When 
You Catch Me? (Co mi zrobisz jak mnie złapiesz?, 1978). In that film, how-
ever, Socialism is portrayed as a system ruined by the managers’ greed but 
otherwise worth living in. It is not the same world of scarcity as in Teddy 
Bear, which we see in the scene of the employees rushing to munch tasty 
snacks after listening to an upbeat speech by their CEO. When the CEO and 
his deputy travel to the West they do not find it fundamentally different 
from socialist Poland, apart from some oddities, such as the French habit of 
eating frogs, that make them laugh. Although, as Krzysztof Toeplitz noted 
in 1978, Bareja had already coined his unique visual register in this film, it 
was only with Teddy Bear that he transcended the conceptual framework of 
the cinema of moral anxiety by showing Socialism and Capitalism as two 
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FROM NORMALITY TO ANTI-POLITICS 
 
It was not merely the contrast between Socialism and Capitalism as eco-
nomic systems, but rather the contrast between Socialism and Capitalism 
as icons and modes of visual expression that explains the success of the 
Frugo campaign in the mid-1990s. As Iga Mergler has argued, the Frugo 
ad heavily relied on the video-clip MTV aesthetics that in the early 1990s 
were perhaps the most uncommon approach seen on the “traditional” tele-
vision channels available to the Polish public. As the first “stream televi-
sion” that was not organized around a narrative principle and had no tradi-
tional programming, it was MTV that prepared the ground for Frugo’s 
astonishing success.69 The Frugo “capitalist” teenager lived in a “video-
clip” world of unfettered consumption, where limitations were imposed 
only by boring “socialist” adults. However, he could spray-paint the 
screen from the inside, thus making adults disappear—in the same way as 
a young viewer can easily zap channels. Unlike the adults, the teenager 
behaves as if being on television were wholly natural for him, and he ob-
viously enjoys it. In other words, two modes of television—a “Capitalist” 
and a “Socialist,”—are contrasted. “Socialist” television, however, fea-
tured not only socialists: among the allegedly “socialist” talking heads 
only one is a communist activist. The remaining three could just as well 
be right-wing propagators of austere Catholic morality. The indifferent 
teenager, therefore, seems to be as weary of communist propaganda as he 
is bored by the Catholic rhetoric of austerity. The Socialism and anti-
Socialism of the 1980s merge into one mode of “traditional television,” 
contrasted to the new video-clip universe. 
The “traditional” iconography was derived from the 1980s pastiches of 
socialist realism. The new video aesthetics appeared in Magdalena 
Łazarkiewicz’s The Last Schoolbell (Ostatni dzwonek, 1989), a story set 
in 1988 which features a group of high-school students setting up a theatre 
group. They prepare a play called “History Lesson,” in which they criti-
cize the official historiography and offer their own symbolic vision of it—
a surreal mixture of distorted images derived from socialist realist iconog-
raphy. The school principal tries to stop them going to a festival, but they 
get round his authority by making a video clip that they send secretly to 
the festival committee. They qualify, and during their actual performance 
they screen their clip in the background. Video technology came to Poland 
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in the 1980s mostly with Western “humanitarian aid” and offered the op-
portunity to bypass the state monopoly of information. Not only were 
tapes of Western action films privately exchanged, but Polish films 
banned by censors were also watched on illegal video copies. The under-
ground Video Studio Gdańsk even started making documentaries that 
were envisioned as an alternative to official production.70 Łazarkiewicz 
signaled the expressive potential that this new medium had for the 
younger generation and embraced the video-clip aesthetic that dominated 
the depictions of Socialism after 1989.71 
This new aesthetics was part and parcel of “anti-politics”—a crucial 
aspect of the neo-liberal governance in post-socialist countries and argua-
bly in the world at large.72 Soon after the “shock therapy” the meaning of 
“anti-politics” in Poland changed. If in the early 1980s it brought hopes of 
a more just social order based on civil society that was outside the state and 
the market, achieved by a strategy of social openness, commitment to dia-
logue, political self-restraint and eschewal of force, its neo-liberal version 
embraced the “market” and conflated “democratization” with “marketiza-
tion.”73 The spirit of neo-liberal anti-politics virtually dominated the Polish 
popular culture of the 1990s. Its emblematic literary figure—Geralt the 
Witcher from Andrzej Sapkowski’s fantasy sagas—was a “professional” 
whose greatest desire was to eschew the petty political quarrels of his con-
temporaries and simply “do a good job.” As many critics have noticed, he 
closely resembled Franz Maurer, the cynical former secret police officer in 
Władysław Pasikowski’s Dogs (Psy, 1992), who was “beyond the good and 
evil” of contemporary Polish politics and eliminated “baddies” irrespective 
of their political affiliation (Fig. 2).74 Pasikowski’s scandalous film was 
iconoclastic towards both the previous system and those who fought against 
it. It mocked a famous quasi-documentary scene from Wajda’s Man of Iron 
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(Człowiek z żelaza, 1981) where workers solemnly carry their dead co-
striker on their shoulders. Pasikowski showed how secret police officers, on 
their way to burn the police files at night, carry their drunken colleague and 
sing the very same protest song as the workers in Man of Iron. 
 
  
Fig. 2 Politics of amnesia - burning archives in Władysław Pasikowski’s Dogs (courtesy 
Studio Filmowe Zebra) 
 
The characters of socialist cinema brought back to grace in the 1990s 
were marked by their a-political attitude. To some extent the post-1989 
success of Teddy Bear can be attributed to its 1991 sequel Controlled 
Conversations (Rozmowy kontrolowane, 1991), where Ryszard Ochódzki 
suddenly changed sides and—partly guided by opportunism and partly by 
accident—became a leading Solidarity resistance fighter, which showed 
what little regard he had for the ideals of either side. Konrad Szołajski’s 
Man of… (Człowiek z…, 1993) was an open mockery of Wajda’s diptych, 
the story of how a “man of flesh and blood” embarks on a risky anti-
communist venture to prove his masculinity to a girl who is only willing 
to love a hero. Even though Szołajski started working on the film as early 
as 1989, he had trouble financing it; he claimed that the post-Solidarity 
elite had rejected his project on political grounds and that socialist censor-
ship à rebours ruled supreme in post-1989 Poland, though with economic 
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rather than political instruments.75 After a few years of Hollywood he-
gemony in Polish cinemas, Man of…, together with Marek Piwowski’s 
The Hijacking of Agata (Uprowadzenie Agaty, 1993), attracted audiences 
to Polish films.76 The latter film was based on the true story of the escape 
of the daughter of the vice-chairman of Parliament, who could not tolerate 
her autocratic father. He was the same politician who in 1988 was still 
giving speeches on the need to reject “Polish surrealism.” Maria Zmarz-
Koczanowicz confessed in 1994 that she now found this scene from her 
own History of a Camera amusing, and that Agata’s father was as “sur-
real” as his political opponents seemed back in 1988.77 When Man of… 
was shown on French television in 1995, a famous Polish actor explained 
to the foreign audience that the very fact that politics could be laughed at 
meant that Poland was “finally a normal country.”78 By the mid-1990s, 
anti-politics and “normality” had become synonymous. 
 
 
ENVISIONING THE NATIONAL CHARACTER 
 
The anti-political laughter was directed at the socialist period and the 
timeless “national character” at the same time.79 Marek Piwowski’s The 
Cruise (Rejs, 1970) or Bareja’s Teddy Bear were extraordinarily popular 
in the 1990s, not only because they ridiculed Socialism, but because their 
humor was ripe with “inside jokes” that were said to be funny only for 
Poles and unintelligible to outsiders.80 Polish comedies of the 1970s, as 
Anita Skwara postulated already in 1990, became the basis for envision-
ing a commercial alternative to Hollywood productions. It was the “third 
way” that reached beyond the propagandist socialist realism and the lofty 
neo-romanticism of the Polish film school engaged in a deadly battle.81 If 
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the “spontaneously neo-romantic” films from the “Polish school” of the 
1950s and 1960s “became a large-scale educational project disseminating 
the knowledge of national mythology and cultural tradition” to complete 
the nineteenth century romantic national project, Polish comedies watched 
in the 1990s on television promoted a new national identity.82 Reified 
“Socialism” became a central component of this new national culture as 
did the belief that being a Pole is a joke, that “life is a comedy.”83 Frugo’s 
success, according to most commentators, lay not in the way it criticized 
Socialism, but in the way it combined the latest “Western” aesthetics with 
the local cultural content. It was supposed to be the very first thoroughly 
Polish yet highly professional advertising campaign, and its authors have 
been hailed ever since as innovative bridge-builders who succeeded in 
combining global trends with local meanings.84 
“Nostalgia” for socialism was often accused by its highbrow conserva-
tive critics of being equivalent to “amnesia,” because it departed from, and 
even criticized, narrative-based history-writing in favor of an MTV “hodge-
podge” style. It may be argued that in the 1990s the socialist films were 
viewed not as narrative representations, but rather as a post-modern “as-
sembly” of largely independent scenes.85 This explains the phenomenon of 
cult films, which were so well-known to their fans that it made no differ-
ence whether they were watched from the beginning, the middle, or the end. 
Piwowski’s The Cruise was inspired by Umberto Eco’s idea of the open 
text and comprised a series of skits that constituted a loose plot: seemingly 
random people meet on a cruise on the Vistula river and decide to stage a 
performance to celebrate the Captain’s birthday.86 The characters were 
mainly played by amateurs, accompanied by a handful of professional ac-
tors who were there to “provoke” the amateurs and incite “happenings.” 
Even though in the 1990s The Cruise was regarded as a freestyle improvisa-
tion provoked more by vodka than by Piwowski’s arrangement, it had a 
very detailed albeit open script written by three authors. The scenes that 
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eventually appeared in the film were carefully selected from a massive cor-
pus of material gathered over several months of shooting. The result looked 
like a low-key production, and in the 1990s was often compared to Danish 
Dogma films, but was actually quite expensive to produce. Piwowski’s 
mentor from the elder generation regretted that The Cruise resembled “scat-
tered beads.” Some, he argued, were beautifully polished, but Piwowski had 
failed to string them on a thread that could make up the necklace that a 
comedy as a genre must constitute.87 Some other cult comedies also used a 
“serial” structure, such as Andrzej Kondratiuk’s Hydro-Puzzle (Hydroza-
gadka, 1970), a comic-book-like mockery of socialist superheroes, or 
Bareja’s comedies that consisted of independent gags.88 
Piwowski’s critical mentor did not appreciate what many others no-
ticed later: that The Cruise established the national Polish comedy.89 As 
early as 1970 Andrzej Wajda wrote that he was extremely surprised when 
he saw how the audience reacted to this “badly acted and terribly shot” 
film. “No previous Polish comedy filmmaker, including myself, had man-
aged to establish such an instant and intimate relationship with the audi-
ence. There was no such laughter and such applause at the screenings of 
the films we had made before. It turned out that what I initially took for 
playful intellectualism corresponds to people’s daily experience and is in 
high social demand. Its authors discovered what the contemporary audi-
ence wants to laugh at. The capital they have collected is priceless, and 
should soon be invested in a new, equally important and desired film.”90 
Teddy Bear further developed the style used by Piwowski (even though he 
drew copiously on the Czech New Wave).91 Bareja made slapstick come-
dies à rebours. His 1960s operetta-like films were still immersed in pre-
war comedy aesthetics. In the 1970s, however, he turned his eyes towards 
everyday life.92 As Krzysztof Toeplitz put it, initially Bareja found show-
ing how people throw cream pies in each other’s faces funny. “When 
Bareja started making comedies about how we can no longer produce 
such cream,” wrote Toeplitz, “he finally found his own, unique register.”93 
This style was gaining popularity in the 1980s—The Cruise was hardly 
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ever screened before 1980, and received full acclaim only after 1989 when 
it became the local response to the “deluge of Hollywood productions.”94 
This anthropology of the “national character” drew on a panoply of 
sources. Funny gags notwithstanding, Teddy Bear is a film about the 
working class, allegedly the apple of the Party’s eye, needing to regain its 
own tradition and history.95 Ochódzki’s double works as a coalman and is, 
like his buddies, so uprooted that he does not know what the very word 
“tradition” means. One of his friends hears a radio announcement that “a 
new lay tradition was born.” He assumes that “tradition” is a proper name 
and wants to give it to his daughter. “Tradition” remains an empty signi-
fier throughout the film until the very last scene, in which a “wise man” 
explain in lofty words: “You cannot give your daughter that name. Noth-
ing can simply be called tradition. Nobody can declare a tradition or es-
tablish it by decree. Those who think they can, shine like a dim candle in 
daylight. Tradition is a thousand-year-old oak. Our cultural tradition is a 
fortress. It is the Christmas carol, the Christmas dinner, folk songs, it is 
our forefathers’ tongue, it is our history that cannot be changed.” Then a 
giant straw teddy bear, which was bought earlier in the official “folk sou-
venir” shop and which embodies national culture perverted by the Com-
munists, explodes. That is why Maciej Łuczak compared Bareja’s film to 
the acclaimed theatre performance Description of Customs (Opis obycza-
jów, 1990), where actors dressed in contemporary costume recite lines 
from an eighteenth-century diary by Jędrzej Kitowicz, one of the most 
important sources used by historians and anthropologists to describe eve-
ryday life in early modern Poland. Both Bareja’s films and Kitowicz’s 
diaries reveal, Łuczak argues, what “contemporary Poles are really like. 
The whole truth about contemporary Poles lurks behind the historical 
costume. The world as Bareja saw it did not perish when Socialism came 
to an end, because absurdity is an integral part of every society.”96 
Piwowski was the other ethnographer, described by Łuczak as a con-
temporary Kitowicz, whose sequel to The Cruise, he suggested, should be 
titled “The Poles’ self-portrait.”97 Piwowski did his “fieldwork” in the 
Praga district of Warsaw, where he spent long hours socializing with the 
proletarian fringe of the socialist society. Praga seemed to him and to 
other Warsaw intellectuals to be the place where “Socialism had no ac-
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cess,” being its “anti-thesis,” “governed by other rules.”98 Amateur actors 
who came from society’s margins were, for Piwowski, more “authentic” 
than professional actors who could not speak “the same way people 
speak in real life.”99 That is why Piwowski’s stars were the duo Jan 
Himilsbach—a Praga gravestone mason and occasionally a writer—and 
Zdzisław Maklakiewicz—a second-rate heart-throb who gave superb 
performances for friends in bars but always lost his extraordinary acting 
faculties when confronted with the camera lens. Before 1989 their gen-
ius was appreciated only by Piwowski and Andrzej Kondratiuk, and in 
the 1970s screenplays written for them were rejected by film associa-
tions. Both actors became “cult figures” in the 1990s, because they were 
the most suitable folk heroes for post-socialist times. Sztos is actually a 
tribute to Uplifted—both are quasi-road movies where two male friends 
embark on a journey that seals their friendship. In both, the decisive 
moment is the “test of money,” when the men have to show that they 
value each other more than material goods or women. In Uplifted, Mak-
lakiewicz and Himilsbach win the lottery and decide to spend the money 
flying planes: they waste the money in order to realize one of their 
dreams. In Sztos two petty criminals go on a journey around Poland’s 
coast, cheating German tourists; they do so not to “make money” but to 
set up a spectacular revenge on a disloyal friend. Both films tell the 
story of how male friendship survives commercialization. Maklakiewicz 
and Himilsbach were perfect anti-bourgeois heroes, who were wor-
shipped not because they were “on top” like regular film celebrities, but 
because they were sympathetic losers who cared as little about money 
and the conspicuous consumption it offered as they cared for work. If 
they lived today, Andrzej Kondratiuk claims, they would be even more 
marginalized than they were in the 1970s, when the post-1989 commod-
ity cult had already started.100 
 
 
DIFFERENT SHADES OF NOIR 
 
Marek Hłasko, a central figure of the “Polish October” of 1956, regretted 
in 1966 that even though history was generous towards Poles with the 
countless tragedies they had to endure, none of these was transformed into 
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world-class literature. Instead, he argued, Beckett, Ionesco, and Kafka had 
become favorite authors in Polish intellectual circles (Ionesco was actu-
ally the most important inspiration for Stanisław Tym, who co-authored 
Teddy Bear and played the main role).101 Polish intellectuals preferred 
blissful ignorance, believing that they lived in a “land of absurdity,” rather 
than in a hell. Gombrowicz’s Ferdydurke became their “Bible,” he recalls, 
and the elite refused to see what everybody else saw with the naked eye. 
“They found refuge in laughter only so as not to see that they were laugh-
able: it is better to be a jester attracting wide audiences than a Hamlet 
talking to empty seats.”102 He argued that Polish literature lacked realism: 
daily life, especially in its economic dimension, was taboo. Unlike with 
the great European classics, Hłasko regretted, future readers would not be 
able to infer the value of money from reading contemporary Polish nov-
els.103 It seems that he pinned more hope on film, on which his own writ-
ing drew deeply and which it mimicked. Hłasko, dubbed the East Euro-
pean James Dean, was obsessed with the cinema noir, which he knew 
extremely well, regarding Humphrey Bogart, next to Dostoyevsky, as one 
of his idols, and when socialist realism ruled supreme, he, like many other 
Poles, found refuge and inspiration in watching Western films.104 He au-
thored scripts for the “Polish School,” and even tried writing for Holly-
wood, but died prematurely. 
The Polish post-war cinema was largely structured by the conundrum 
of the Stalinist terror. Historical debates after 1989 hinged upon the con-
troversy as to whether Socialism was a tragedy or a farce. Those who 
thought it a tragedy, envisioned it as a political tragedy, those who 
thought it a farce, envisioned it mostly as an economic farce. The former 
conceived characters like the light-hearted cabaret actress in Bugajski’s 
Interrogation (Przesłuchanie, 1982), who discovers that there is nothing 
funny about a Stalinist jail. It was Bugajski’s Interrogation, and not works 
by Wajda and the other filmmakers of the “cinema of moral anxiety,” that 
became known as “the most anti-communist film in the history of the 
Polish cinema.”105 Even though Interrogation was shot in 1981 and edited 
in 1982, it was shelved for seven years. Its 1989 release marked the coun-
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try’s transition to post-socialism. In a speech introducing Interrogation at 
its first public screening, Wajda declared that “this première ends the film 
history of People’s Poland. Tomorrow will be the very first day of free 
Poland’s cinematography.”106 Interrogation tells the story of a cheerful 
cabaret actress, hailed by one critic as the “new Antigone,”107 who is un-
justly arrested and undergoes a brutal interrogation in a Stalinist jail, in 
order to manufacture false charges against somebody she once knew. It is 
the story of her psychic transformation from recklessness and ignorance to 
stony defiance. When she is eventually freed, she is reunited with her 
daughter, who was fathered by one of her interrogators and born in jail. 
Just as the jail scenes were read as an allegory of Poland in the 1980s—it 
was not by chance that the première took place on 13 December 1989, the 
anniversary of the declaration of Martial Law—so the final scenes offered 
a spark of bitter hope for the future. The film perfectly suited the role Wajda 
envisioned for it—to be a cathartic moment that separated the difficult 
past from the brighter future, and to serve as the foundation on which 
Democratic Poland could bring to light a “secret truth” about communist 
crimes. Before Interrogation was first screened in 1989, it was watched 
on illegal video copies or read in printed samizdat versions throughout the 
1980s.108 Prevented by censorship from being publicly shown, the further 
it was kept out of sight, the more powerful its impact became. This role 
was confirmed by the avalanche of prizes it received at the Polish Film 
Festival in 1990, and by the Golden Palm awarded to Krystyna Janda as 
female lead in Cannes in the same year. 
Initially a commercial success, Interrogation virtually disappeared 
from public memory and sight soon after 1990. While socialist comedies 
ruled supreme, modest visual productions showed Stalinism by “localiz-
ing” Hollywood clichés. Some action movies, like Jacek Bromski’s Polish 
Cuisine (Kuchnia Polska, 1991), were inspired by the success of Interro-
gation and starred its main actress, Krystyna Janda. Others, like Janusz 
Kijowski in State of Fear (Stan Strachu, 1989), chose a dramatic actor as 
their hero. Reciting Hamlet’s monologues to empty theatre seats, he plans 
to flee abroad, but is against his will entrusted with a suitcase full of 
money intended for the Solidarity underground. He decides to deliver it, 
even though the secret police are constantly on his back and break every-
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body except him with beatings and intimidation. In Wojciech Wójcik’s 
early film Kill me at the End (Zabić na końcu, 1990) two factory workers 
decide to carry out a bank robbery inspired by the script of a Hollywood 
action movie. Even though they find the script perfectly realistic and fol-
low it meticulously, Polish reality proves entirely different from the film 
clichés. The robbery fails, and the film’s refrain drives the point home: 
“Casablanca will never happen here.” It was black comedy, and not black 
crime fiction, that turned out to be the more appropriate representation of 
Socialism for the wider population. It was not a political tragedy, but an 
economic farce told in the language cobbled together by Bareja and Pi-
wowski (whose sense of humor Bareja exploited and continued) that 
turned out to be a more credible rendering of Socialism for both the popu-
lation and critics of different political preferences.109 
This victory was short-lived. Banal nationalism in a nostalgic mode 
was soon replaced by a slightly less benign nationalism in its neo-
conservative version. Marcin Meller, who in 1998 coined the phrase 
“Frugo generation” and rebuked the superficial video-clip youth culture 
for its historical amnesia,110 confessed in Maria Zmarz-Koczanowicz’s 
documentary Generation ’89 (Pokolenie ’89, 2001) that because of the 
crime prevailing in the streets, Poland needed its Giuliani, and neo-
conservatism was the only way forward. A Giuliani duly arrived in the 
person of Lech Kaczyński, first an uncompromising minister of justice, 
then the “sheriff of Warsaw,” and since 2005 the President of Poland. 
Still in the late 1990s, the old socialist TV crime series Calling 07 (07 
zgłoś się, 1976–1987) was more popular than professionally-made “capi-
talist” films such as Wojciech Wójcik’s Extradition (Ekstradycja, 1995). 
The socialist TV series featured, as Katarzyna Wajda argued, only petty 
and mildly dangerous crime that seemed more realistic and appealing 
than the international mafia networks, exorbitant sums, ruthless charac-
ters and spectacular explosions that were the substance of new crime 
films.111 
The neo-noir aesthetic has gradually gained realism, however, and it 
has done so by putting on historical costume. The plot of Wójcik’s There 
and Back (Tam i z powrotem, 2001) virtually copied his earlier Kill me at 
the End. It too is set in the city of Łódź, but this time in 1965, where a 
bank robbery is organized for the purpose of buying fake passports and 
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fleeing the country. If Hollywood clichés seemed unsuited to Polish real-
ity in Kill me at the End, There and Back was saturated with a noir-like 
aesthetic: the malicious secret police in black leather coats were omni-
present, the machine-like system ruined individual talents, and the posi-
tive hero was separated from the outside world and his own family. 
Around 2001 the biggest private television channel TVN changed its pro-
file and turned to portraying crime virtually non-stop. TVN journalists 
became masters of sensational news, and interventionist TV programs and 
documentaries were interwoven with crime series, Hollywood films, and 
reenacted court hearings; recently TVN produced a feature film about the 
Polish mafia.112 It also sponsored a spectacular documentary series called 
The Great Escapes (Wielkie Ucieczki, 2005), partly reenacting and partly 
narrating real stories of people who attempted to flee socialist Poland to 
live a “normal” life beyond the Iron Curtain. 
The vision of socialist Poland as a police state was most powerfully re-
alized in One day in People’s Poland (Jeden dzień w PRL, 2005) by Ma-
ciej Drygas, who was called by one critic “the George Orwell of Polish 
documentaries.”113 This film is a compilation of socialist documentaries, 
archival TV footage, amateur movies and socialist newsreels, edited with 
masterly precision and accompanied by a soundtrack of voices reading out 
fragments of letters, official correspondence, police reports, and even 
radio programs with weather forecasts. Drygas takes the viewer on a 
dawn-till-dusk tour through 27 September 1962, the date of a private con-
versation between a high party official and a Catholic bishop, of which he 
had found a secret recording, although eventually he did not include it in 
the film. The documentary is structured upon the juxtaposition of banality 
and terror: stories of mundane daily activities intersect with images of 
police surveillance (Fig. 3). Although Drygas’s crew researched that day’s 
events in various state archives, it was in the archives of the secret police, 
stored at the Institute for National Remembrance, that he found his key 
data: “Initially, I did not have a thesis to prove,” he said in an interview, 
“but the more I immersed myself in the Institute’s archives, the more I 
was stunned by the scale of police surveillance.”114 
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Fig. 3 An Orwellian ‘antidote for nostalgia’ in Maciej Drygas’ One Day in People’s 
Poland (courtesy Drygas Production) 
 
In order to show the “true image” of People’s Poland Drygas, like 
many historians associated with the Institute for National Remem-
brance,115 reproduced the secret police point of view. Unlike the authors 
of The Lost Archives of the Secret Services (Tajne taśmy SB, 2002), who 
in 2001 found a handful of “operational” footage of the main Warsaw 
dissidents made by the secret services and not only showed it in their 
documentary but also interviewed its authors and thus unveiled some fas-
cinating aspects of the “relationship” the secret services developed with 
the people under surveillance, Drygas in his documentary tried to repro-
duce the gaze that the secret services were supposed to have trained on 
society at large. One Day in People’s Poland has no individual hero, but 
shows Socialism as a Polish collective tragedy, sometimes with elements 
of farce. The jury of the Krakow Documentary Film Festival commended 
One Day in People’s Poland as “a convincing account of the absurdities 
of a totalitarian system,”116 and one critic recalled that even though he had 
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burst out laughing while watching it, on second thoughts the absurdities of 
Socialism were not funny at all.117 Drygas’s “time travel” was received as 
the best therapy against nostalgia.118 It subverted the “realism” of Bareja’s 
comedies by concentrating on the very mundane realities of everyday life 
and put some classic tropes from Piwowski’s The Cruise—such as a po-
lice investigation into an anti-socialist slogan on a toilet wall, or criticism 
of a poem that was not “optimistic enough”—into an Orwellian account of 
a police state.119 
Those who praise Drygas’s documentary as the first “anti-nostalgic 
cure” forget that Bareja was actually the pioneer of crime cinema in Po-
land and had made the first Polish criminal series in the mid-1960s. It 
seems, however, that Bareja deliberately abandoned this genre, although 
police officers appear in all his comedies. The central character of his 
series Alternatywy 4 (Alternatywy 4, 1983) is a housing-project caretaker 
called Stanisław Angel (Anioł) who tries to observe, control and terrorize 
the entire community he is actually supposed to help. Rather than empha-
sizing his power, Bareja reveals its limits, and shows how the community 
gets rid of him.120 When Szołajski’s Man of… was attacked by right-
wingers Zygmunt Kałużyński wrote that they were behaving as if “they 
had walked into a cabaret and made a fuss that they were unable to pray 
there;” instead, he argued that “the filmmaker who understands that our 
national condition is hilarious will be a master.”121 Szołajski’s film was a 
tribute to the tradition initiated by the prematurely dead Andrzej Munk, 
who was first to show the Polish tragedy tongue-in-cheek.122 Against 
Kałużyński’s expectation, it was not a young director, but a dead one—
Stanisław Bareja—who became the post-1989 master of irony and whose 
popularity supported Kałużyński’s opinion that, in the long run, laughter 
is a fairer judgment than any attempt to moralize over politics. 
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POLAND’S PROTRACTED TRANSITION 
 
It could be argued that the cinema that turned Socialism into a fetish was 
in fact part and parcel of a novel genre of the Polish commercial cinema 
of the 1990s, often dubbed by critics as “personal,” “private” or “nostal-
gic.”123 Its major representatives—Jan Jakub Kolski, Andrzej Barański, 
and Andrzej Kondratiuk—shot art-house films which praised the “slow” 
life of the Polish countryside, far away from the centers of power and 
politics. Their blend of the spirit of anti-politics with attempts at pinpoint-
ing the national character drew on the peasant lifestyle and re-valued folk 
culture. Even though some of their films were set in the 1950s and 1960s, 
any reference to the historical context was usually bracketed. For exam-
ple, Kolski’s Jańcio the Water Man (Jańcio Wodnik, 1991), tells the story 
of a folk “philosopher-errant” who is tempted to market his healing pow-
ers but finally comes to realize that material gains and physical pleasures 
are transitory and it is more worthwhile to search for one’s private meta-
physics. The only “marker” of the time is a car produced in the 1950s—a 
gift by some people whom Jańcio has healed.124 Such “escapism” from the 
post-socialist commercial world produced a counter-reaction in the form 
of “socially engaged cinema.”125 However, rather then being a mere 
“documentation” of post-socialist realities, it drew heavily on Holly-
woodian aesthetics. Krzysztof Krauze’s acclaimed Debt (Dług, 1999) was 
a psychological thriller, based on the true story of two young businessmen 
murdering a psychopath who terrorizes them by demanding the return of a 
non-existent debt. Robert Gliński’s Hi, Tereska (Cześć, Tereska, 2000), a 
black-and-white quasi-documentary feature on an innocent teenage girl 
from the Warsaw Praga district who becomes a mindless killer, was hailed 
as an accurate portrayal of life in the post-socialist “urban ghetto.” Yet, as 
Marek Radziwon wrote in a devastating review, Gliński’s film had grown 
out of a provincial desire for a “Polish Bronx” and was as inadequate as a 
depiction of Polish realities as the Hollywood-inspired action movies.126 
The phenomenon of post-socialist crime and the media-induced “fear” 
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made it easier to ascribe all the present problems to the socialist past and 
the doings of post-communist criminals. 
The cinematography of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s cannot 
be looked at separately from the films made in the 1980s. There is a sense 
in which post-socialist cinematography began in 1981 with Stanisław 
Bareja’s Teddy Bear. Although the 1980s are usually perceived as “stag-
nant,” Poland was undergoing a protracted transition towards flexible 
capitalism, reflected also in the symbolic regime with its stark contrast 
between reified Socialism and Capitalism, later to become central to the 
1990s order. Erstwhile party officials, strongly resembling Ryszard 
Ochódzki, took to the seemingly “new” capitalist reality like fish to water. 
1989 was neither the end, nor the beginning, but a middle point in this 
“protracted transition.” Even though 1989 was a breakthrough, the 1976–
2006 period saw numerous continuities. As the economist Kazimierz 
Poznanski argued, it was Edward Gierek, the first independent Polish 
socialist leader, who by taking loans from Western banks and govern-
ments triggered the Polish “protracted transition.”127 Although initially 
Gierek’s modernization project seemed to work, in 1976 his government 
began to lose control over it, and the concomitant crisis years pulled so-
cialist Poland into the orbit of global “casino Capitalism,” where fluctuat-
ing exchange rates became a prime factor determining the stability, or 
otherwise, of local economies.128 
The bizarre economic regime of 1980s Poland, where the only real 
value—“hard” currency—was officially banned and where the pockets of 
“capitalist” private entrepreneurship gradually prevailed over the official 
state economy, was an example of a classic post-Fordist restructuring and 
devaluation of industrial spaces that took off in the early 1970s in the 
world at large.129 Even though the socialists and the alternative elites pro-
moted by the Solidarity trade union were officially engaged in a deadly 
symbolic strife, their goals were quite convergent—both sides hoped to 
end the “surreal” situation and restore “normality.”130 Commodity fetish-
ism and the consumer culture that was so painfully experienced in Poland 
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in the early 1990s had first taken root in the early 1970s and dominated 
the “occult” economy of the 1980s. The post-Fordist aesthetics and new 
national culture, reflected in the films of Piwowski and Bareja, received 
full acclaim in the 1990s, becoming part of an emerging regime that 






Alternatywy 4 (Alternatywy 4, Stanisław Bareja, Poland, 1983) 
At Full Gallop (Cwał, Krzysztof Zanussi, Poland, 1996) 
Bareizm (Bareizm, Agnieszka Arnold, Poland, 1997) 
Calling 07 (07 zgłoś się, Krzysztof Szmagier, Andrzej Jerzy Piotrowski, Kazimierz Tarnas, 
Poland, 1976–1987) 
Controlled Conversations (Rozmowy kontrolowane, Sylwester Chęciński, Poland, 1991) 
Death as a Slice of Bread (Śmierć jak kromka chleba, Kazimierz Kutz, Poland, 1994) 
Debt (Dług, Krzysztof Krauze, Poland, 1999) 
Description of Customs (Opis obyczajów, Mikołaj Grabowski, Poland, 1990) 
Dignity (Godność, Roman Wionczek, Poland, 1984) 
Dogs (Psy, Władysław Pasikowski, Poland, 1992) 
Dreams are more interesting (Marzenia są ciekawsze, Stanisław Janicki, Poland, 1999) 
Extradition (Ekstradycja, Wojciech Wójcik, Poland, 1995) 
Four Troopers and a Dog (Czterej pancerni i pies, Konrad Nałęcki, Andrzej Czekalski, 
Poland, 1966–1970) 
Generation ’89 (Pokolenie ’89, Maria Zmarz-Koczanowicz, Poland, 2001) 
Hi, Tereska (Cześć, Tereska, Robert Gliński, Poland, 2000) 
History of a Camera (Historia pewnej kamery, Maria Zmarz-Koczanowicz, Poland, 1993) 
Hydro-Puzzle (Hydrozagadka, Andrzej Kondratiuk, Poland, 1970) 
Interrogation (Przesłuchanie, Ryszard Bugajski, Poland, 1982) 
Jańcio the Water Man (Jańcio Wodnik, Jan Jakub Kolski, Poland, 1991) 
Kill me at the End (Zabić na końcu, Wojciech Wójcik, Poland, 1990) 
Man of… (Człowiek z…, Konrad Szołajski, Poland, 1993) 
Man of Marble (Człowiek z marmuru, Andrzej Wajda, Poland, 1976) 
Man of Iron (Człowiek z żelaza, Andrzej Wajda, Poland, 1981) 
One day in People’s Poland (Jeden dzień w PRL, Maciej Drygas, Poland, 2005) 
Segment ’76 (Segment ’76, Oksar Kaszyński, Poland, 2003) 
Sexmission (Seksmisja, Juliusz Machulski, Poland, 1983) 
Snatch (Guy Ritchie, United Kingdom, 2000) 
State of Fear (Stan Strachu, Janusz Kijowski, Poland, 1989) 
Sunday Pranks (Niedzielne igraszki, Robert Gliński, Poland, 1983) 
Sztos (Sztos, Olaf Lubaszenko, Poland, 1997) 
Taxi Drivers (Zmiennicy, Stanisław Bareja, Poland, 1986) 
Teddy Bear (Miś, Stanisław Bareja, Poland, 1980) 
The Blokers (Blokersi, Sylwester Latkowski, Poland, 2001) 
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The Cruise (Rejs, Marek Piwowski, Poland, 1970) 
The Fashionable 1980s (Moda na Obciach, Piotr Boruszkowski, Sławomir Koehler, Po-
land, 2003) 
The Great Escapes (Wielkie Ucieczki, Grzegorz Madej, Radosław Dunaszewski, Wojciech 
Bockenheim, Poland, 2005) 
The Hijacking of Agata (Uprowadzenie Agaty, Marek Piwowski, Poland, 1993) 
The Last Schoolbell (Ostatni dzwonek, Magdalena Łazarkiewicz, Poland, 1989) 
The Lost Archives of the Secret Services (Tajne taśmy SB, Piotr Morawski, Poland, 2002) 
The Sting (George Roy Hill, USA, 1973) 
There and Back (Tam i z powrotem, Wojciech Wójcik, Poland, 2001) 
Uplifted (Wniebowzięci, Andrzej Kondratiuk, Poland, 1973) 
What Will You Do When You Catch Me? (Co mi zrobisz jak mnie złapiesz?, Stanisław 
Bareja, Poland, 1978) 
 
 
 
